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The objective of this article is to analyze the welfare effects of the Multifiber 
Agreement (MFA, 1974-1995) and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC, 
1995-2005) regime on the cotton yarn sector in Greece.  We consider cotton yarn as a 
final product in a vertically linked market setting, consisting of a) the cotton seed 
market (primary production), b) the labor market for cotton yarn (intermediate 
market), c) the cotton lint market (intermediate market) and d) the cotton yarn market.   
Cotton seed producers supply mills with cotton seed where it is processed and altered 
to cotton lint.  The cotton lint is then used by cotton yarn producers together with 
labor as the two main inputs to cotton yarn production
1. 
The price linkages that exist in vertical markets add complications to the process 
of measuring welfare effects.  Changes in price-policy in one market affect producers 
of the other markets. To deal with these complications, we use a multi-market 
approach, which allows us to take into consideration the simultaneous nature of the 
price changes.  This approach has been used in the past by a number of researchers 
(Katranidis,  et. al., 2005; Jeong et. al., 2004; Brannlund and Kristrom, 1996) to 
examine welfare effects in a multi-market setting where two or more prices change 
simultaneously.   
We call this model “the sequential approach” and extend past research by 
comparing the welfare results obtained from the “sequential” multi-market model to 
the welfare results obtained with a “single-market approach”.  This approach rests on 
the assumption that the final market for cotton yarn is a market for a “necessary 
output”, which allows us to examine any welfare changes from a simultaneous change 
in two or more prices, in a single market, i.e. the market for the necessary output.  On 
a theoretical level, the welfare results obtained from the “single-market approach” and 
  1the “multi-market sequential approach” should be equal.  Empirically though, the 
results obtained from these two approaches differ substantially.   
  The primary goal of this article, however, is to examine the effects of trade 
liberalization on the Greek market for cotton yarn and outline the methodological 
approach of estimating price-induced welfare effects in a multi-market setting.  The 
single-market approach merely touches on an interesting subject that researchers need 
to be aware of when the availability of data restricts them to estimating welfare 
changes in one market. The method outlined and the empirical considerations we 
focus on are, especially, useful for researchers in agricultural economics, where 
interrelated markets are often encountered and data availability prevents the full 
development of a multi-market model.  
 
The MFA and the Markets for Cotton, Yarn and Labor 
In 1974, a quota regime was instituted for Textile and Clothing (T&C) products by 
the initial MFA (in force since 1/1/1974) that provided rules for the imposition of 
quotas through bilateral agreements and unilateral actions.  Since then, the MFA was 
extended several times, after initiation by developed countries, to cover a larger 
number of products and countries (1978, MFA II; 1982, MFA III; 1986 MFA IV; 
1991 MFA IV extended).  Quota impositions were applied on imports from 
developing countries when surges of imports occurred (Francois et. al. 2000).  In 
1987, when the Round of Uruguay began, the discussion for trade liberalization in 
T&C was initiated.  By the end of the Uruguay Round, the ATC (1995) came into 
force.  The ATC realized the idea of trade liberalization by requiring the gradual 
elimination of any quota restrictions, which were still in place from the MFA regime, 
  2by the year 2005.  Fifty one percent (51%) of quotas were to be eliminated by 
12/31/2004 and the other 49% as of 1/1/2005.   
The gradual elimination of existing quotas exerted negative pressure on the 
incomes of Greek yarn producers, who now faced lower prices for their product and a 
more competitive international market.  Export levels decreased and imports surged.  
At the same time, due to other international developments, Greek producers were also 
faced with higher costs for labor input.  We examine the welfare effects of these two 
simultaneous price changes during the period of the MFA regime (1974-1994), when 
quotas were in place, and the initial period of the ATC regime (1995-2000), when 
quotas were being gradually eliminated.  The welfare effects during the ATC regime 
represent the gradual move from the MFA quota regime to the free trade scenario. 
Prior to estimating these price-induced welfare effects to cotton yarn producers, 
we need to examine the price-policies in the markets for seed, cotton and labor, in 
order  to determine how each market will affect yarn production and how each has to 
be appropriately included in the theoretical and the mathematical model.   
The production of yarn rests on the primary production of seed.  Producers supply 
mills with seed where it is deseeded and altered to cotton.  In 1981, when Greece 
entered the EU, the Common Market Organization (CMO) called for deficiency 
payments to seed producers.  This resulted in significant increases to production.  The 
increased production was absorbed in whole by cotton producers, who are obligated 
to purchase from farmers all the quantities of seed they supply.  Thus, after 1981, the 
production of cotton surged as well.  The question arises if the surge in the production 
of seed and cotton affected the welfare of producers of yarn.   
To answer this question we consider Greece to be a small exporting country (the 
price taker case) for cotton (Figure 1).  In the cotton market, there is no government 
  3intervention and domestic prices equal world prices.  Producers of cotton are, 
however, obligated to purchase from farmers all the quantities of seed they supply at a 
predefined price.  Thus, the supply of cotton is perfectly inelastic (Karagiannis et. al., 




c q q →  will be directed towards 
the export market (exports increase by AB).  This will leave domestic demand (point 
A) and prices unaffected( )
0
c c p p = .  Αs prices of cotton will not change, any surge in 
production will leave consumers of cotton, namely, the producers of yarn, in terms of 
changes in their welfare, completely unaffected (area c).  
 
Figure 1.  The market for Cotton 
   
Thus, the increase in the production levels of seed and cotton, after Greece entered 
the EU, could not have had any effect on the yarn sector.  Any change in price- policy, 
directed toward the seed market, will not affect the welfare of producers in the yarn 
market, as long as the small country assumption is valid.   
Next, we look at the labor market.  Although in the past decade the immigrant 
population surged, the cost of labor retained a slightly increasing trend, leveling off 
  4after 1995.  Greece’s labor costs stand at three times the respective cost of labor in 
comparison to other major yarn exporting countries in the world (8 highest-volume 
exporting countries).  The recent trend of inflow of immigrant workers to Greece is 
expected to decrease the cost of labor and benefit producers. 
The above theoretical considerations suggest that we have two simultaneous 
changes in prices that affect producers’ welfare.  These are the decrease in the prices 
of yarn, induced by the gradual liberalization of trade and the increase in prices of 
labor.  In sum, we model the change in cotton-yarn producers’ welfare resulting from 
the simultaneous change in the price of one of the inputs, in an intermediate market 
(price of labor), combined with a change in the price of the final good (price of yarn).   
 
Methodology 
To model the effect of trade liberalization for T&C on cotton yarn producers, we start 
by defining two prices: a) prices observed in Greece, as determined by the 
intervention regime for yarn, since the MFA was instituted.  We call these prices 
“intervention prices” (or initial prices). b) Prices that prevail in world markets or the 
prices that would prevail in Greece in the case of no intervention for T&C.  We call 
these prices “non-intervention prices” (or final prices).  The welfare effect, of the 
MFA intervention regime, is the geometric area under the supply curve defined 
between the intervention and the non-intervention prices.  In other words, the effect of 
trade liberalization on producers’ welfare is the change in producers’ surplus, that was 
annually transferred to them during the MFA regime, which producers will have to 
forego, if trade is liberalized.  Respectively, in the labor market, we define as 
intervention prices the prices of labor observed in Greece whereas the non-
  5intervention prices are those paid to labor in the 8 highest-volume yarn exporting 
countries in the world.   
 
Sequential Approach 
We start with the representative cotton yarn producer who maximizes profits: 
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where   is the supply of cotton yarn (final good), p
s




c are the derived demand for cotton lint and the price of cotton lint respectively; 
 is the cost of labor,   is the derived demand for labor,   is the price vector of 
the rest of the inputs to production for j=2…n,   is the derived demand for the 
respective input in the production of cotton yarn and   the vector of all the other 
factors and inputs assumed to be constant.  From the maximization problem we 
deduce that profits for producers of yarn will be a function of the prices of yarn, the 
prices of cotton, the labor cost and the costs of the other inputs to production.  Thus, 
profits will be expressed by a profit function of the form: 
1 y w 1
d
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  6If we consider a price change for labor, cotton and yarn, then the quasi-rents to the 
producers of yarn are equal to:  
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where i= the initial prices (i.e. 0 or the intervention prices ) and w= the final prices 
(i.e. 1 or the international prices or non-intervention prices).  Equation 3 can be 
expressed with the following line integral (Kaplan, 1993; JHS, 1982): 
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where L is the path we follow depending on the sequence of the price changes.  Given 
that producers maximize profits, the profit function is continuously differentiable and 
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  7From Hotelling’s lemma and the Envelope Theorem: 
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We substitute equations 6 in equation 5.  We also consider that the factors 
~
R  and   
 are constant so these terms are equal to zero.  Furthermore, the integral for 
cotton integrates from   to  .  However, as we argued earlier, there is no 











c c p p = . So, this integral is also equal to zero.  Consequently, the change in 
welfare is equal to the sum of the following integrals: 
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Note that this is only one of the paths that we can follow.  Equation 7 tells us that 
the change in welfare for producers of cotton yarn is equal to two geometric areas, i.e. 
first, the area under the supply curve for cotton yarn given initial prices of labor 
( )
0
1 1 y y w w =  and second the area below the derived demand for labor given final prices 
of cotton yarn ( )
1
y y p p = .  Another possible path is that of equation 8: 
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  8where the sequence of price changes is now reversed.  The area below the demand 
curve is now estimated given ( )
0
y y p p =  and the area below the supply curve is 
estimated given ( )
1
1 1 y y w w = .  The reason, why these two paths produce the same 
welfare effect, is because second cross derivatives with respect to the prices in a profit 


























Since we know that for a well-behaved profit function, Young’s Theorem will always 
hold the differential in the line integral of equation 4 will always be an exact 
differential. Therefore, the line integral is going to be path independent (Kaplan, 
1993).  Any path, we follow, will produce the same welfare effects, as long as the 
profit function is well-behaved.   
Respectively, the change in consumers’ welfare is equal to the area below the 
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Where   is equal to the prices of all substitutes  i subs p , m i ... 1 =  to yarn consumption and 





Single  Market Approach 
To examine the welfare effects from the price changes in one market we start by 
making the assumption that the output of cotton yarn is a “necessary output”.  If 
prices decrease below a certain level  l
k
y p , where k=i,w for initial and final prices, then 
  9production shuts down.  Thus  l
k
y p  is the maximum price of cotton yarn for which 
production is equal to zero. 
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The path we described in the previous section is that depicted by L1a-b (Figure 2).   
We now follow a “shutdown path”, i.e. a path that passes through the shutdown area 
where l
k
y y p p = , such as path L2a-b-c.  The change in quasi rents can then be split into 
three parts: 
 
() () ( ) 222 R RLa RLb RLc ∆= ∆ + ∆ + ∆                  (11) 
 
Figure 2.  Two paths to estimate the welfare effect from the price changes 
   
 
 
By taking the line integrals we obtain the following expression for the change in 
quasi rents: 
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   (12) 
 
However, in path L2a the second integral is equal to zero as the upper and lower 
limits of the integral are the same.  The same holds true in path L2c where the second 
integral is equal to zero for the same reason.  In path L2b both integrals are equal to 
zero as we are passing through the shutdown path and quasi-rents equal zero.  The 
remaining integrals provide us with a measure for the change in welfare, which uses 
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Theoretically, the welfare estimates from the sequential (equations 7 or 8) and the 
one-market approach (equation 13) provide us with the same measure of welfare 
effects.  By using the single-market approach less data are required for the estimation 
of welfare changes.  This approach is especially useful for researchers when data is 
hard to find.  On the other hand, the sequential approach, although it requires more 
data, reduces the importance of obtaining good estimates of supply and demand 
outside the range of contemplated changes (Just, Hueth and Schmitz, 1982).   
 
  11Statistical Estimation Method  
Sequential  Approach 
The estimation of the welfare effects requires the supply function for yarn, the derived 
demand function for cotton, the derived demand function for labor and the derived 
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where   is the lagged production of yarn,  = the lagged demand for cotton, 
= the lagged demand for labor in the yarn market,   = the prices of 
synthetic yarn,  = the prices of textiles,   = the prices of non-cotton, non-
synthetic yarn and 
s
t y Q 1 , −
d
t c Q 1 , −
d
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As the error components are correlated simultaneous estimation must be used.  
The used estimation method was Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) with 
restrictions (Iterated Zellner Efficient Estimation - IZEF).  SUR is appropriate when 
in a system of equations none of the dependent variables shows up on the right hand 
side of the equations and the error components are correlated (Pyndick και Rubinfeld, 
1981).   
Lagged demand and supply variables enter our system of equations as explanatory 
variables.  In the demand equation habitual consumption requires the use of past 
year’s demand as explanatory variables. In the supply equation we used past year’s 
quantities supplied , according to Nerlove (1958).   
j
t i Q 1 , −
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which are equivalent to -α2=β1, γ2=β4 and γ1=-α4.  These restrictions are necessary in 
empirical work to assure that the welfare results from equations 7 and 8 are equal
2. 
 
One - Market Approach 
For the one market approach we only need to estimate the supply and demand of 
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The welfare changes are then estimated with the use of equations 9 and 13 which we 
derived in the previous section. 
 The data for our statistical analysis came from the Greek Ministry of Agriculture, 
the World Cotton Statistics (ICAC, 2003), the World Textile Demand (ICAC, 2003), 
ICAP and the Annual Statistics of the Greek Industry.  The CPI index(1987=1) was used 
as the numeraire commodity and all measures were transformed to metric.  The world 
prices for labor and the world prices for cotton yarn are a weighted average estimated 
from the 8 largest volume-exporting countries in the world.  The Durbin-h method 
was used to test for autocorrelation.   
To assess the statistical reliability of our welfare estimates we use bootstrapping 
techniques.  The importance of this procedure in agricultural economics has been 
stressed by Kling and Sexton (1990), Jeong, et. al.  (2001), Bullock  et. al, (2002).  
  13Bootstrapping techniques allow us to obtain confidence intervals for our welfare 
estimates asserting reliability to our results.  Non-parametric Bootstrap was used 
(Efron, 1979) for data from 1975 to 2000, a total of 26 observations.  The Bootstrap 
procedure established a random sample of 26 observations using our initial sample 
while drawing with replacement.  The new sample data was used to estimate the 
regressions.  The results were collected onto a table that included the beta parameters 
l ( ) β , as well as the estimate for the welfare change  l ( ) w .  This procedure was repeated 
n times creating a table with n estimates of the parameters  l β  and the welfare change 
l w.  In empirical research we usually consider n=1000.  The bootstrap was only 
performed for the welfare results from the sequential approach. 
All estimations were done in 1987 Greek drachmas and the results were converted 
to 1987 $ US.  The SAS econometric program was used.     
 
Regression Results and Comparison of the Two Models 
The Regression Results are presented in Table 1. The system of equations from the 
sequential approach explains 89% of the variability.  In the equation for the supply of 
yarn all the coefficients carry the expected signs and are significant.  In the equation 
for the derived demand for labor we observe that the price of cotton lint exhibits an 
insignificant coefficient.  The same holds true for the price of labor in the derived 
demand for lint.  Changes in the price of labor do not seem to affect the derived 
demand for lint and vice versa.  The remainder of the variables, in these two 
equations, carry the expected coefficient and are significant.  In the demand-for-yarn 
equation, the prices of textiles, non-cotton yarns, non-synthetic yarns show 
insignificant coefficients.  Durbin-h tests did not show any autocorrelation problems.  
  14None of the restrictions were statistically significant, however, their use in this model 
has a theoretical basis so we choose to include them in the analysis.  The single 
market model explains 75% of the variability.  Similar observations are made 
regarding the statistical significance of the variables in these two equations. 
 
Table 1.  Regression Results from the Sequential and the Single Market Model 
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(0.96)    -0.015     
 (-0.97)   
NS NC P , Price of non-
cotton, non-synthetic yarn 
    5.86E-6 
(0.66)    7.2E-6 
(0.8) 
synth P Price of Synthetic 
yarn 
    -8.81E-7 
(-0.09)    6.18E-7 
(0.06) 
tex P  Price of  Textiles      -0.007 
(-0.81)    -0.007 
(-0.84) 
Lag Dy(Lagged Demand 
of yarn)      0.462
***
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*** 
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***
(2.62)   
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for Labor)    0.688
***
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(t-statistic of the lagged 















2 (Adjusted)  0.89 0.75 





Wrestriction(2)  -52.286 
(-0.99) 
Wrestriction(3)  -16.139 
(-0.8) 
 
The values in parenthesis are t-values,
 *** significant at 0.01 level, 
* significant at 0.1 level 
 Own estimation 
 
 
Using equations 7 and 9 for the sequential approach and equations 9 and 13 for 
the single-market approach, we estimated the changes in producers’ and consumers’ 
  15surpluses for yarn, induced by the changes in yarn prices and the cost of labor input.  
The results can be seen in Table 2. 
 
Table  2.  Annual Transfers to Producers and Consumers (mil 1987 US $) 














1976  123,88 -125,92  174,24  -124,64 
1977  106,42 -113,78  176,35  -112,98 
1978  37,55 -74,13  92,38  -73,31 
1979  149,69 -132,17  230,55  -131,83 
1980  135,31 -146,06  220,41  -145,73 
1981  191,18 -162,34  276,13  -161,94 
1982  136,76 -159,70  229,73  -159,27 
1983  50,77 -109,84  136,85  -109,20 
1984  76,58 -113,08  153,53  -112,80 
1985  182,24 -150,42  252,34  -150,33 
1986  170,21 -170,38  246,49  -170,53 
1987  150,32 -165,53  222,15  -166,99 
1988  90,41 -132,71  164,19  -133,05 
1989  41,17 -112,01  114,80  -112,62 
1990  128,06 -144,41  194,63  -144,78 
1991  68,95 -129,83  139,49  -130,73 
1992  95,43 -118,97  148,92  -118,94 
1993  -8,63 -49,44  33,70  -49,44 
1994  64,50 -94,25  87,41  -94,57 
1995  73,42 -97,14  89,46  -97,15 
1996  59,53 -89,27  80,97  -89,56 
1997  46,44 -84,43  65,48  -84,97 
1998  64,96 -93,14  82,70  -93,44 
1999  34,12 -62,24  49,49  -62,09 
2000  10,01 -45,91  28,03  -45,52 
Own Estimations 
 
The two models show the same trends (see Figure 3), however, the welfare results 
for producers from the single-market model are consistently higher than the results 
from the sequential approach.  The question remains as to which set of results are 
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Figure 3.  Annual Transfers to Producers of Cotton Yarn (mil. 1987 US $ ). 
 
Own Estimations     
  
  According to Just, Hueth and Schmitz (1982), “…when data permit, the welfare 
effects,  associated with a multiple price change, can be calculated  more accurately 
by estimating supply and demand in each market for which prices change and then 
using the sequential approach, where the welfare change associated with each price 
change is evaluated in its respective market…”.    With the single market approach 
we are using the part of the supply curve for which we don’t have any observations 
for, i.e. we have to estimate the area under the supply curve near the axes, whereas in 
the sequential approach all of our observations fall in the range of the contemplated 
price changes. Thus the welfare effects estimated with the sequential approach are 
more accurate.  However, a full analysis is still pending, in the literature, regarding 
the accuracy of welfare estimates in sequential and single-market models (Dadakas 
and Katranidis, 2006).  With the above considerations we continue the welfare 




According to our results and for the period under consideration, transfers to yarn 
producers decreased substantially, over the last 3 decades, making Greek cotton yarn 
production less viable in the international markets.  Until 1987, transfers remained at 
relatively high levels exhibiting high volatility.  Downward spikes are observed on the 
dates the MFAs were signed (with the exception of MFA II).  These spikes were 
followed by immediate increases in the transfers reflecting policy attempts to support 
producers’ income.   
After 1987 we observe a persistent downward trend in transfers to Greek 
producers.  1986 was the year, when a further extension of the MFA, namely the 
MFA IV, was signed.  At the same time, and in the context of the Round of Uruguay, 
deliberations began that aimed to the elimination of all quotas for T&C.  Both 
developments might have triggered changes in protecting the relevant markets.  In 
1991 (MFA IV Extended), the first official attempt was made to eliminate the quota 
regime. However, it was not signed until 1994.  The third extension of 1993 caused 
transfers to drop to negative levels
3.  By the year 2000, and after the decision for the 
gradual elimination of all quotas, transfers were almost equal to zero.   
We also contrasted the losses to producers’ welfare with the gains to consumers’ 
welfare (Figure 4).  The top line in Figure 4 is the pattern of producers’ surplus during 
the MFA and the ATC regime.  It represents gains to producers’ welfare due to the 
intervention regime.  The bottom line is the consumers’ surplus during the MFA and 
the ATC regime.  It represents losses to consumers’ welfare due to the same regime.  
  18The middle line represents the sum of both effects, i.e. the sum of the changes in 
producers’ plus consumers’ surplus.    
 
Figure 4.  Annual transfers to producers and consumers of cotton yarn (mil. 
1987 $ US)   
Own Estimations 
  
After 1987 the (negative) changes in consumers’ surplus exhibited an upward 
trend.  This means that consumers’ losses became less when compared to the years 
after the initial signing of the MFA.  Therefore, losses in producers’ welfare were 
somewhat leveled by the gains to consumers.   
 
  19Bootstrap Analysis 
To add statistical meaning to our previous results we used the bootstrap method.   
Table 3 shows the bootstrapped mean annual income transfers to producers of cotton 
yarn using as separator key dates, the years various MFAs were resigned.   
According to the results presented on Table 3, transfers to producers, after the 
MFA was instituted (1974), i.e. for the period 1975-1977, reached a three year 
average of 85 mil. $ US (column 2, Table 3).  With the signing of the MFA II, this 
amount increased to 149 mil $ US. After 1982, we observe a persistent downward 
trend that led mean annual transfers to producers down to 42 mil. $ US by 1996-2000.   
 
 
Table 3.  Transfers to the cotton yarn producers (MFA years).  Bootstrapped 































118.63    
(12.19) 
93.61    
(13.40) 
54.80   
(10.06) 
41.82    
(6.15) 




Figure 5 presents these results with Box-Whiskers plots.  Box –Whiskers plots 
allow us to visualize the entire distribution of a random variable.  Each plot provides 
us with the corresponding 5%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 95% quantiles of the bootstrap 
sample.  The median is represented with a cross inside the box. The plot allows us to 





  20Figure 5.  Box-Whiskers Plots for MFA years (mil. 1987 $ US). 




  We used the “shift method” (Noreen, 1989) to test for the significance of the 
differences.  Mean annual income transfers decreased, after 1982, by 31 mil. $ US. 







⎛+ ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ ⎜ + ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎞
⎟  (see Table 5) and implies that producers noted, after the 
implementation of the MFA III a significant decrease in their incomes (the Figure of 
the distributions for the shift method can be seen in the Appendix).  After 1986, and 
the beginning of the negotiations for the liberalization of trade, in the context of the 
Uruguay Round, mean annual transfers to producers dropped by 24 mil. $ US.  This 
difference also represents a significant decrease in transfers.  The initiation of the 
discussions on trade liberalization had a profound effect on Greek producers.  The 
same scenario, in terms of statistical significance, can be seen when we compare the 
period 1987-1991 (MFA IV) to 1992-1995 (MFA IVe).  Transfers dropped by 39.5 
  21mil. $ US and, by 1995, Greek yarn producers’ realized incomes equaled half those 
realized in the 80’s.  Finally, after the signing of the ATC (1995) transfers decreased 
by another 12 mil. $ US, which also represents a significant reduction in transfers to 
producers.  The signing of the ATC seemed to exercise further pressure on producers’ 
incomes.  
 
Table 5.  T-statistic for the difference in period mean annual transfers to 






















62.85  -31.03  -23.63 -39.52 -12.11 
Criterion  4.032 3.707 3.499  3.499  3.499 
   
nge+1
NS +1
  1 1 
1 1 0.981 









⎟≤ a  0 0 0  0  0.019 
*** significant at 0.01 level, 
* significant at 0.1 level, 
 Own estimations 
 
The results suggest that producers started realizing lower levels of transfers after 
1982.  Transfers recovered in 1985 and 1986 (see figure 2), however, the initiation 
and the further progress in the negotiations of the Uruguay Round sealed the fate of 
the MFAs, as early as 1987.  Mean annual income transfers decreased after the MFA 
IV (1986), after the MFA IV Extensions (1991-1994) and after the singing of the 
ATC (1995).  By 1992, most of the negotiated changes to the MFA were completed 
and a ten-year plan for the gradual elimination of quotas was in place.  This means 
that our analysis supports that although the final agreement was signed in 1995, the 
after-effects of the Uruguay Round were already felt by producers some years earlier, 
i.e. after 1987. 
  22Finally, we looked in a more detailed manner at the effects of EU entry on 
producers’ welfare.  Since changes in policy directed toward the seed market are not 
expected to have any effect on yarn producers, EU entry should not have effects on 
the pattern of imports protection and accordingly to the transfers realized by yarn 
producers.  To test this hypothesis, we compared transfers prior and after EU entry, 
i.e. 1975-1981 and 1982-1987 respectively.  Mean annual income transfers in the 
period prior 1981 equaled 120 mil. $ US (Table 6).  After it, the respective transfers 
increased to 126 mil. $ US.  This represents, however, a non-significant increase in 
the relevant amounts.   
 
Table 6.  T-statistic for the difference in period mean annual transfers to 
producers of cotton yarn After EU entry 
 
Years  1975-1981  Pre-EU period  1982-1987 Post-EU period  





Mean Difference  6.27 
Criterion value  
 
3.106 
   
nge+1
NS +1
  0.7892 









⎟≤ a  0.2108 
 




These results support the argument that EU entry did not have any effect on 
producers’ transfers.  As we argued earlier, EU policies, at least those related to the 
agricultural sector, cannot influence yarn producers’ welfare as the markets for seed 
and cotton are disjoint.  The pattern of import protection, applied in Greece after 1981 
in the yarn sector, did not significantly differ from the one applied prior to EU entry.   
  23Conclusions  
  We examined the transfers to producers of cotton-yarn in Greece using a multi-
market setting that is appropriate when vertically or horizontally related markets are 
considered.  We developed the model for a small exporting country using a sequential 
and a single-market approach.  The single-market approach produced consistently 
higher price-induced welfare effects to producers than the sequential approach.   
Theory suggests that the results from the sequential approach are more likely to be 
accurate so we proceeded with the welfare analysis and the bootstrap sample using 
only the sequential method. 
The results showed that transfers to Greek cotton yarn producers significantly 
decreased over the last two decades. An interesting finding is that the Greek accession 
to the European Union (1981) did not affect the magnitude of transfers to Greek yarn 
producers. This means that the pattern of import protection in the yarn sector did not 
change because of the entry. Our findings indicate that all the developments in policy-
induced changes in producer’s welfare are to be attributed to the relevant regulations 
included in the MFA (1974) as well as in its further modifications. All our results 
agree with the expected effects from MFA regulations.  
 Producers’ incomes decreased over the past years making cotton yarn production 
less competitive and exerting negative pressure on producer’s welfare.  Producers 
started realizing lower mean annual income transfers as early as 1982.  The beginning 
of the discussions of 1986, in the context of the Uruguay Round on trade 
liberalization, signaled a significant negative impact on producer’s welfare.  Changes 
in the pattern of imports protection, which were decided with the signing of MFA IV 
(1986/7), affected negatively the transfers to yarn producers.  After the signing of the 
ATC, and the implementation of the plan for the gradual elimination of quotas, the 
  24reduction in producers’ transfers reached the lowest levels we observe in the period 
we study.  
Finally, after 1987 losses in producers’ welfare were partially leveled by the gains 
to consumers. The latter realized price decreases and significant increases in their 
welfare. 
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Appendix 
Figure A.  Distributions on differences (numbers of bootstrapped observations) 
 
  28                                                                                                                                            
1 We refer here forth to the cotton seed market as the seed market, the market for cotton lint as the 
cotton market and the market for cotton yarn as the yarn market. 
2 In technical terms, these restrictions assure that the line integral of equation 4 is an “exact differential 
equation”, which is path independent.  Although, in theory, any path we follow will provide us with the 
same welfare effects in econometric work, we have to impose these restrictions to assure that the profit 
function is well behaved. 
3 Negative levels of transfers show that producers would be better off in a free trade scenario. 
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